We show that comprehenders' expectations about upcoming discourse coherence relations influence the resolution of local structural ambiguity. We employ cases in which two clauses share both a syntactic relationship and a discourse relationship, and hence in which syntactic and discourse processing might be expected to interact. An off-line sentencecompletion study and an on-line self-paced reading study examined readers' expectations for high/low relative-clause attachments following implicit-causality and non-implicit causality verbs (John detests/babysits the children of the musician who. . .). In the off-line study, the widely reported low-attachment preference for English is observed in the non-implicit causality condition, but this preference gives way to more high attachments in the implicit-causality condition in cases in which (i) the verb's causally implicated referent occupies the high-attachment position and (ii) the relative clause provides an explanation for the event described by the matrix clause (e.g., . . .who are arrogant and rude). In the on-line study, a similar preference for high attachment emerges in the implicit-causality context-crucially, before the occurrence of any linguistic evidence that the RC does in fact provide an explanation-whereas the low-attachment preference is consistent elsewhere. These findings constitute the first demonstration that expectations about ensuing discourse coherence relationships can elicit full reversals in syntactic attachment preferences, and that these discourse-level expectations can affect on-line disambiguation as rapidly as lexical and morphosyntactic cues.
Introduction
As cognitive agents attempting to comprehend their world, people do not merely gather information through their senses about the situations they encounter. They also draw inferences necessary to interpret these situations as coherent. For example, if one encountered a scene in which an individual is lying dead on the floor and another is standing nearby with a gun, one would likely infer that the death was caused by the second individual having shot the first, despite not having witnessed the event firsthand.
One might not reach the same conclusion if the individual standing nearby was instead holding a stethoscope, suggesting other possible causal connections, e.g., that a doctor is trying to help the person on the floor.
Interpreting natural language discourses that describe such situations triggers the same type of inferential processes. For instance, upon hearing (1):
(1) John detests his coworkers. They are arrogant and rude.
A comprehender will typically not be content to merely interpret the two sentences as independent statements about the world, but will instead infer that the coworkers' arrogance and rudeness are the reasons why John detests them. This inference comes naturally despite the fact that no linguistic material in the passage explicitly cues a
